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Abstract 
This paper describes a process to provide low-cost and timely cost estimation for weapons 
system and services procurements based on data analytics. This will enable quick estimation 
that can serve as a sanity check for more formal estimation methods. Specifically, this cost 
estimation technique is built on the price-to-win methodology used by defense companies to 
respond to DoD solicitations. The process is based on market clearing prices as reflected by 
actual winning bids, expert knowledge to validate the scope of work, and an algorithm 
developed to incorporate these aspects into an estimate. The process is an “estimate of the 
estimate” and meant as an adjunct to formal cost estimating processes. The value lies in the 
ability to create quick, inexpensive estimates responsive to management needs while the 
formal cost estimating process proceeds. 
Introduction 
Cost estimation is as much science as it is art. And, like most science and art, it is 
resource intensive and time-consuming. The science is driven by the desire to accurately 
capture the elements of cost—including the amount of labor required, labor rates, overhead 
rates, and so forth—to provide an accurate starting point for budgeting and program 
management activities. The art of cost estimation is the fine line between accepting provided 
data and critically examining that data before accepting it. The most basic inputs to a cost 
model are the cost elements defined and captured by accountants: direct labor, materials, 
and overhead. However, identifying these cost elements is just the science. The art 
demands experience with both the data and the requirements of systems development. 
Good cost estimates at every stage of the development process must have this mixture of 
art and science. The goal of this paper is to present a tool that uses the art and science to 
provide inexpensive and timely initial cost estimates for weapons systems and services 
procurements based on data analytics.  
Realistic cost estimation is a necessity for successful weapon systems development 
and services contracts. However, cost estimates are frequently wrong, or unrealistic, and in 
many cases, time-consuming and unresponsive. Further, as the GAO states, “bias and over 
optimism creep into estimates that advocates of weapon systems prepare, and the 
estimates tend to be too low” (GAO, 2009). The science of cost estimation depends on 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 264 - 
accurate data consisting of unambiguous definitions of the tasks, standardized work 
breakdown structures, recognition of the uncertainties of system development, and the 
recognition that significant program changes will cause changes in the estimate (GAO, 
2009). The art is found in the familiarity and know-how of both the cost estimators as well as 
the cost engineers and others involved in applying knowledge of developments to develop 
estimates.  
Current challenges with the cost estimation process include 
 known costs being excluded without adequate justification 
 invalid historical cost data 
 inconsistent consideration of inflation 
 cost and time necessary to accomplish 
It is this last issue of cost and time necessary to accomplish that is the focus of this 
effort. Whether cost estimator, cost engineer, or project manager, the need for quick, ROM 
(rough order of magnitude) cost estimates is an ever-present requirement of the DoD 
acquisition workforce. Users and contractors routinely ask for more capability from existing 
systems, as well as proposing new systems. Young (Young & Markley, 2008) describes the 
scenario: 
“How soon can you get me a rough order of magnitude [ROM] on the cost?” 
The project engineer does a mental retrieval and concludes that a full 
bottoms up engineering estimate is needed, but that will take too long—about 
three to four months. The project engineer knows it has to be faster, so he 
throws a number out. “I need a month to develop a ROM.” “Give me a ROM 
in two weeks if you really want any chance of funding this initiative,” is the 
reply. 
Unfortunately, the time and money to act on these requests is in short supply. We 
need a tool that can react to the demands of present-day acquisition, yet be accurate 
enough to satisfy the standards of cost estimating. 
The proposed tool was developed for the defense industry while the authors were 
employed by one of the major defense contractors. The development of this tool initially 
focused on one business-focused cost estimating activity, determining the price-to-win 
(PTW) in defense markets. We believe this process, however, offers the means to address 
the scenario described above, and those similar situations that occur every day across the 
DoD acquisition space. It is important to note this process is not a formal cost estimation 
process, nor is it meant to supplant the recognized cost estimating processes. This 
“estimating the estimate” is an adjunct to formal cost estimating to enable cost estimators, 
cost engineers, and the PMO a quick way to develop an estimate—of the formal cost 
estimate. The process is based on basic economic theory—the law of supply and demand 
and market clearing theory, the point where producers’ products and consumers’ demand 
are equal. This quick estimation process can serve as a sanity check for the more validated 
and formal estimation methods. It can also help address the challenge of responding to 
requests for ROM pricing in case of extra funding availability, end of year funding, etc. 
Cost estimation is serious business with very real fiscal and operational 
consequences. This tool builds on the science of cost estimation by incorporating both the 
actual winning bids for DoD competitions and the associated costs throughout the 
development. In other words, it models the market using prices that were successfully bid. 
This becomes the market clearing price. This approach offers the possibility of providing 
macro-level estimates based on microeconomic theory and historical trends and weapon 
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systems development using a data analytics approach. The science still defines the 
determinants or drivers of cost such as productivity or labor rates. The art is in modeling the 
market. 
The following is the research question to be examined: 
Can market pricing provide a reasonably accurate cost estimating methodology that 
is quick and less expensive to execute that provides actionable information to government 
program managers? 
Specifically, we seek to examine whether a data analytics approach based on market 
pricing will yield actionable cost estimates.  
Cost Estimation 
The field of cost estimation is rich in research. However, of late the preponderance of 
the effort appears to be focused on software cost estimation. This is understandable given 
the importance of software in the modern world, and the opaque nature of estimating 
software development. And, of course, the fact that an ever-larger percentage of capability 
in weapons systems comes from the software-hardware integration, rather than hardware 
itself. Regardless of the focus, the basic quantitative and qualitative methods are used in all 
cost estimating.  
Cost estimation for both software, hardware, and service projects is a formal, 
documented process. Review of the field identifies the broadly defined methods to estimate 
costs. These include the following (Boehm, 1984; Evans, Lanham, & Marsh, 2006; 





 algorithmic models; 
 expert judgment; and 
 Price-to-Win (PTW). 
The most commonly used techniques in the DoD are analogy, parametric (top-
down), and engineering (bottom-up) estimating (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). Analogy simply 
compares similar developments using historically captured cost information. A parametric or 
top-down estimate builds a cost estimate for the development project from historical data 
comparing variables through a statistical relationship. Finally, an engineering or bottom up 
estimate is a comprehensive cost estimate starting at the work package level and 
aggregating costs to build a more complete estimate. 
The Parkinson estimation is based on the Parkinson principle that “work expands to 
fill the available volume.” It is only mentioned to acknowledge that while not a rigorous 
estimating tool, there are times when the cost is determined by available resources, rather 
than a defined end-state. 
Algorithmic cost estimation models use one or more algorithms to analyze variables 
considered to be the major cost drivers for the weapons system. The algorithmic methods 
are based on mathematical models that produce cost estimates as a function of a number of 
variables that are considered to be the major cost factors (Leung & Fan, 2002). 
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Expert judgment simply acknowledges that engineering experts should be able to 
estimate the effort necessary to accomplish development tasks and translate those 
estimates to costs in technological activities—where they have experience. Thus, expert 
judgment is defined as the consultation of one or more experts (Hughes, 1996). 
Some disagree on whether the final category, price-to-win (PTW), is actually a cost 
estimation methodology, categorizing it as a cost management process rather than a cost 
estimating process (Boehm, 1984). In the PTW, the cost estimate is equated to the price 
believed necessary to beat competitors. In other words, PTW is a market-focused estimate 
focused on identifying the price necessary to win a government competition. Defense 
companies regularly use PTW as a target price to drive internal cost-savings measures as 
well as to drive the design-to-cost (DTC) target. Notwithstanding this characterization, we 
propose that certain aspects of the PTW process can be used to approximate initial system 
costs. The proposed tool combines two of these cost estimation methodologies, expert 
judgment to define an algorithm as a PTW to provide an initial cost estimate.  
Price-to-Win 
Regardless of stated evaluation criteria, price is a significant factor in most 
government contract decisions. PTW is used in industries that have limited customers—
monopsonies including the U.S. defense industry. While often mentioned in the broad 
category of pricing methodologies, it is often dismissed as “the price believed necessary to 
win the contract,” thus not acceptable for formal cost estimating. This definition has evolved 
into developing a strategy that fits the customer budget rather than the effort required to 
complete the work (Leung & Fan, 2002). It is true the defense industry uses PTW for 
competitive reasons. Industry competitors want to present the government customer with 
their lowest price, while ensuring adherence to RFP requirements, at least in comparison to 
other competitors. The PTW is part of a decision-making process that includes an 
assessment of the firms’ ability to develop a cost-competitive offer within their risk tolerance. 
PTW is focused on ensuring the industry solution meets the government needs, while 
emphasizing the competitive advantage of individual companies. It is worth noting that PTW 
is widely practiced in the U.S. defense industry. In fact, as a matter of process, many firms 
require a PTW determination before deciding to spend the money necessary to prepare a 
proposal, and throughout the proposal development.  
The PTW approach consists of estimating the price for each competitor, a potentially 
expensive process in that the current practice of PTW requires accurate assessments and 
analysis of competitive intelligence on the competition. Defense companies seek to 
understand in detail both competitor companies’ strengths and weaknesses, as well as their 
pricing structure. PTW also analyzes the nuances of the government customer, specifically 
what the award history is, as well as any trends in reasons for selections. The competitive 
intelligence is based on open source materials to try to determine both any competitive 
advantages individual companies may have, as well as any unique approaches to solving 
the government’s problem. A type process of PTW includes the steps shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. The Price-to-Win Process 
 
A consideration in competitive intelligence assessments is that the U.S. defense 
industry is more or less balanced in capability across like companies. For instance, 
Raytheon and Lockheed Martin have legacy radar and missile businesses and compete in 
those areas. Boeing and Lockheed Martin compete in the high-performance fighter aircraft 
market and so on. The drawdowns and consolidations of the defense industry in the 1990s, 
as well as more recent consolidation, make competition in those areas fierce. Losing a 
government contract could mean exiting that line of business, thus determining what the 
competitor is going to do, and deciding an offer price is a high-stakes effort.  
By industry capability we also mean intellectual property, manufacturing efficiency, 
and human resources. Intellectual property is driven by the investment firms make in 
Independent Research and Development (IRAD) efforts. Manufacturing efficiency tends to 
mirror the overall industry and remains a source of potential profit if managed cost-
effectively. Human resources refer to engineering talent—the product of quality education 
and individual potential. The defense industry capability is driven by the labor market, and 
manufacturing efficiency is determined by the overall state-of-the-art. The defense industry 
draws from the same talent pool. Differences in competitive pricing originate from specific 
qualifications or competitive advantage of intellectual property from self-developed research 
and development programs, not necessarily widely varying labor rates. The PTW reflects the 
market clearing price. 
For the defense firm, the PTW analysis should yield a value that addresses customer 
need that also will be successful against competition. A finalized PTW analysis reflects a 
schedule-performance tradeoff that becomes a pacing item for development of the proposed 
system.  
The PTW approach is a macro-economic examination of an existing DoD program. 
While not specific enough to address the actual development of a cost estimate, it could 
serve as both ROM and as an indicator in the continued pursuit of a detailed cost estimate. 
These estimates would not replace the detailed parametric cost estimates, or IGCE, nor be 
a substitute for market research. Instead, the solution would provide the PM/contracting 
officer a means to validate/confirm the results of more in-depth cost analysis, while providing 
program office personnel a starting point for budgeting, and cost realism. 
The PTW Process Translated 
As noted, this tool leverages the science and art of cost estimation through the 
application of expert judgment and algorithmic data modeling. Expert judgment is an 
estimate based on the expertise of one or more people familiar with the costs and scope of 
similar system developments (Keeney & Winterfeldt, 1989; Morris, 1974). In the case of 
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PTW, the expert judgment comes from people familiar with the market for that particular 
product. In defense firms this includes cost engineers, specific engineering domain 
engineering experts, and the business development staff. In use as a cost estimation tool for 
the DoD, expert judgment would include government cost engineers and domain experts, as 
well as results of the market research activities (RFI—Requests for Information).  
The data used for the tool consists of the actual winning bids and the associated 
scope of past programs, plus a mechanism to track the inevitable changes to the cost 
estimate as changes occur throughout the development. This approach could be more 
accurately described as an “algorithmic” method. It offers the possibility of providing macro-
level estimates based on microeconomic theory and historical trends and weapon systems 
development using a data analytics approach.  
Three data elements—scope, budget, and contract award price—were used to 
develop an algorithm to explain the winning price ranges for the competitive solicitations 
chosen. Although focused on the price necessary to win a contract, we believe these price 
ranges should correspond to the initial cost estimates provided by the government. Cost is 
estimated as a mathematical function of product, project, and process attributes whose 
values are estimated by project managers. 
An essential factor of this analysis is the ability to identify both initial costs against 
specific SOW tasks, as well as track cost-growth/scope increase as the product developed. 
As we continue to develop the tool, we expect this analysis to show relationships between 
similar contracts of similar value scope. 
In developing the tool, we started with three basic macro-economic assumptions: 
1. In non-commodity markets the equilibrium price is the mean of a range of 
prices which are normally distributed about the equilibrium price. The 
government contracting market is a non-commodity market. 
2. The equilibrium price represents the balancing of costs, risks, and margin for 
the government and the contractor. If one of these three elements is 
negatively skewed for a specific supplier, they would exit the market. If one of 
these three elements is positively skewed for a specific supplier, competition 
would respond and the price would adjust accordingly. 
3. In the government contracting market, a monopsony, supply exceeds 
demand and the price for the goods or services will be below the equilibrium 
price.  
The first step in this cost estimation process is to identify an equilibrium price (EP). 
The EP is approximated by developing two extreme estimates for a given government 
provided statement of work (SOW). This first task depends on expert judgment to establish 
an initial range of possible prices, a low-price estimate (LPE) and a high-price estimate 
(HPE). These expert estimates are considered from both the government and contractor 
perspective, acknowledging the different ways government and contractor cost estimators 
consider a system cost. The low end of the estimate reflects the expert’s opinion on the cost 
associated with meeting the minimums of schedule and performance. The low-price 
estimate is the absolute minimum the government estimator believes is necessary for 
schedule and performance execution, and therefore reflects a price that represents the 
extreme risk for a contractor to execute. Figure 1 shows the normal distribution of the LPE-
HPE estimates. 
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 Equilibrium Price 
On the other end of the spectrum, the HPE represents a price the government 
believes addresses the risk for both government and contractor. These two extremes should 
define the possible market for the system to be developed, with the mean representing the 
equilibrium price in balanced market where the price reflects an optimal balance between 
costs, risks, and contractor margin.  
As noted, the normal market clearing distribution will tend to be skewed because of 
monopsony in defense markets. In this case, supply will always exceed demand; therefore, 
the mean will tend to be lower than the equilibrium price. Figure 2 represents that 
distribution. 
 
 Bids in a Monopsony Market 
Obviously, the government expert estimator needs access to the contractor 
perspectives on price, but that is normal. We believe government marketing research RFI 
could assist in this data collection. There are two steps to solicit these estimates. First, as is 
often done today, the PMO would request a ROM price as part of the market research effort. 
The challenge with ROM pricing estimates provided by potential contractors is the contractor 
concern their ROM will become the government target price. Thus, contractors will always 
add a “pad” to the ROM to reflect unknown and unforeseen risk. The government expert 
should be the arbiter of these estimates. In planning the RFI, the PMO should also request 
an LPE and HPE using the definitions provided above. Assuming multiple responses to the 
market research, the government expert would be able to develop a reasonable estimate of 
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the LPE and HPE. The government expert could use those estimates in developing a 
government LPE/HPE or maintain separate analysis and weigh the results prior to the next 
step.  
The next step determines the cost estimate range and uses the second aspect of 
cost estimation, the algorithmic cost model. This step consists of two sequential activities 
built on historical contracting data (at this point proprietary in nature). The first part, which is 
ongoing, is to collect data on the defense industrial market in the United States. This data 
collection captures the open source information available on defense contracts. The data 
include the DoD request for proposal (RFP) details, including project scope and the 
government’s budget. This information is matched to contract award price. Initially the 
emphasis has been on major programs (ACAT I); however, we intend to continue to gather 
as much data as possible. The initial dataset is small and reflects only the past three years. 
As more data becomes available over time, we believe the accuracy of the model will be 
improved. 
The second part of this step uses a statistically relevant number of prior 
procurements (aligned to scope) to estimate the range of costs for a specific SOW type. The 
intent is to create a frequency distribution of the actual bids received. This information forms 
the basis for the algorithm used to identify the competitive price ranges for the sampled 
procurements. From the contractor perspective (PTW) the winning price should be below the 
equilibrium price by bidders altering the balance of cost, risk, and margin to win the 
contract—and reflecting the market clearing price. Thus, from a market clearing perspective, 
using historical data for like-system procurements, an initial estimate of the cost could be 
derived. Figure 3 represents that range. The final price is then determined by using 
statistical tools and applying the algorithm. 
 
 Algorithm Applied 
Estimating the Estimate in Practice 
To demonstrate the process, the following example is presented. The example 
project is a communications/electronics retrofit solution for surface ships for the U.S. Navy. 
The desired vehicle is a firm, fixed price contract, and the evaluation criteria is LPTA 
(Lowest Price Technically Acceptable). This effort is for a build-to-print production contract 
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for 89 systems for three different ship types. The expert judgment estimate determined by 
RFI for the LPE and HPE is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Cost Estimates Example 
 
The first step is to estimate the market price for each ship type. (For purposes of this 
example, we will estimate Ship A only.) The LPE and HPE represent the extremes of the 
market pricing for the solution fitted on the respective ship. LPE is defined as the estimate 
theoretically technically compliant (in this case LPTA), which minimizes labor costs and 
technical and programmatic risk. HPE is the estimate capturing all reasonable labor costs 
and factors in all programmatic and technical risk. Other factors not apparent in this example 
are the quantities of ships and the corresponding communications/electronics system 
solution. 
Using proprietary historical information, the following calculations in Table 3 
represent a range of LPTA estimates for the Ship Type A work.  
Table 3. LPTA Example 
 
Using the same process, but approaching the problem from a best value approach, 
the results of the analysis are shown in Table 4. Figure 4 is a graphical representation of the 
plotted ranges for the Ship A estimate. In this example, the 90% probability value was within 
3% of the actual winning bid. 
Table 4. Best Value Example 
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 Plotted Ranges 
Figure 5 shows the S-curves and the range of estimates for the different contract 
types, LPTA< CP and FFP (Best Value). The end state of this “estimate of the estimate” is a 
statistical range of pricing that provides the key layers, project engineers, cost estimators, 
program office, and contracting officials a starting point. To return to the scenario, instead of 
an expert judgment-only guided “guestimate” or worse, the project engineer can provide an 
empirically based estimate. To be sure, it will not be the final estimate, but it will provide a 
starting point. More importantly it will provide an answer to a very tough question. 
 
 S-Curves for Example 
Conclusion 
This paper proposes using a defense industry tool, the price-to-win, to assist the cost 
estimating process for the DoD. Using market pricing and accepting the idea that while costs 
differ between competitors, their costs are generally similar, we suggest that applying 
economic market clearing ideas can provide a quick, inexpensive, and reasonably accurate 
cost estimate for most efforts.  
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This approach provides a macro-economic estimate of DoD programs. While not 
specific enough to address the actual development of a cost estimate, it could serve as both 
ROM, as well as an indicator in the continued pursuit of detailed cost proposals. The 
estimates would not replace the detailed parametric cost estimates, or IGCE, nor be a 
substitute for market research. Instead, the solution would provide a means to 
validate/confirm the results of more in-depth cost analysis, while providing program office 
personnel a starting point for budgeting and cost realism. 
There are both pragmatic and theoretical limitations to this approach. Pragmatically, 
the technique must be tested using real data available only to the government. A second 
potential limitation is confidence in the ability of the government cost engineers (expert 
judgment) to define the LPE and HPE estimates. A major assumption of this approach is 
that government cost engineers and project managers are, in fact, experts and have a 
reasonable understanding of the range of costs for similar development projects. Our 
experience reinforces this belief, but it is clear that the better the estimates for the LPE and 
HPE, the better the overall estimate.  
Theoretically, there must be a spread of at least one standard deviation but not too 
close to the end of the distribution in order to address the entire market. Theoretical 
limitations also include the available market data both in system and software procurements, 
and the amount of variance assumed to be in the distribution.  
Finally, this tool can be improved and constantly updated by linking the DoD 
information on winning bids and the associated scope with the existing algorithm. A next 
step in this research is to request the use of said data and formally establish a validation 
effort to determine the quality of the results of the tools’ computations.  
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